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ABSTRACT Throughout the Eurozone crisis, observers called upon Germany to assume leadership. 
Yet, Germany has not emerged as the hoped-for leader. According to the issue at stake, we observe 
three different outcomes: firstly, Germany refused to lead; secondly, Germany assumed leadership, 
but failed to deliver; thirdly, Germany acted as a successful leader. This article examines the reasons 
for this variance by analysing and comparing one case for each outcome: the first financial assistance 
to Greece, the failed attempt to establish a ‘super-commissioner’, and the shaping of the Fiscal 
Compact. The analysis includes original data, gathered through interviews in Brussels, Frankfurt and 
Berlin. The variance in Germany’s behaviour can be explained by employing a rational institutionalist 
model of leadership. Germany’s emergence as a leader depends on the expected costs and benefits of 
leading. Its impact, in contrast, depends on its power, the distribution of preferences among the actors 
involved, and institutional constraints. 
KEY WORDS Decision Making; EU Economic Governance; Euro Area Crisis; European Union; 
Germany; Leadership
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, journalists, academics and politicians have called upon 
Germany to provide leadership in order to overcome the crisis (Financial Times 2012; Matthijs and 
Blyth 2011; Steinmeier and Steinbrück 2010). Maybe most impressively Poland’s foreign minister made 
a plea for German leadership: 
I demand of Germany that, for its own sake and for ours, it help the eurozone survive and prosper. […] 
I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear its inactivity. You have become Europe’s 
indispensable nation. You may not fail to lead: not dominate, but to lead in reform (Sikorski 2011). 
From a political science perspective, this demand for leadership raises theoretically motivated 
questions: What is political leadership? Why and how does it emerge? And, once emerged, how does 
political leadership affect outcomes? What determines its success or failure? In order to answer these 
questions, I first provide a definition of political leadership which is based on a review of existing 
leadership research in political science. In a second step, I rely on rational institutionalist assumptions 
to develop a theoretical model that explains both the emergence and the success of leadership. 
The third part is devoted to applying the model to Germany’s role in the crisis. As I will show, Germany 
has not emerged as a leader under all circumstances. Instead, its behaviour has varied according to the 
issue at stake. By analysing the first financial assistance to Greece (no leadership), the attempt to 
create a ‘super-commissioner’ (failed leadership), and finally Germany’s role in shaping the Fiscal 
Compact (successful leadership), I can test the expectations put forward by the model and provide an 
explanation for Germany’s ambiguous role in the crisis. The case studies rely primarily on 23 semi-
structured interviews carried out at the European Union’s (EU) institutions in Brussels, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the German Ministry of Finance. 
From a theoretical perspective, this article contributes to filling a striking gap in the literature, where 
‘research on political leadership is disparate, under-theorised and under-researched’ (Hartley and 
Benington 2011). This is especially true with regard to the rationalist research paradigm (Brennan and 
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Brooks 2014: 161). A rational institutionalist model of leadership thus contributes to one of the most 
urgent challenges on the leadership research agenda, namely ‘to integrate the leadership factor into 
both rational choice analysis and the “new” institutionalism’ (Elgie 2001: 8579). 
As regards the empirical value added, the article helps to explain Germany’s behaviour in the crisis and 
contributes to understanding if and how leadership can be a way of overcoming the crisis. So far, 
Germany has been analysed as a potential hegemon in the EU (e.g. Bulmer and Paterson 2013). By 
using a different conceptual perspective, namely leadership, this article examines empirical aspects 
which previously have not been at the centre of the analysis. 
 
CONCEPTUALISATION 
Most definitions of political leadership are based on one or more of the following three key aspects. 
First, leadership is commonly associated with power, understood as the ‘ability to affect the behaviour 
of others to get the outcomes one wants’ (Nye 2010: 306). Power is based on material, institutional or 
ideational resources (Table 1 in online appendix). However, leadership is not the same as power. It 
also consists in the pursuit of a common goal and innovation (Burns 1978: 12, 17f; Malnes 1995: 99-
106; Underdal 1994: 178-82). 
The second defining criterion is the pursuit of a common goal (Burns 1978: 18f, 425-32). This does not 
mean, however, that leadership is an altruistic sacrifice. The leader must also be better off at the end 
of the day (Frohlich et al. 1971: 7; Mattli 1999: 13). Moreover, specific preferences about how to reach 
the common goal might diverge, which implies that despite the presence of a leader there are still 
relative winners and losers (Kindleberger 1981: 243). Finally, the perception of a common goal is 
subjective and historically contingent. This implies that something which was perceived of as a 
common goal at the time leadership emerged can a posteriori turn out to be beneficial only to some 
actors or even to no one at all. 
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As a third defining feature, leadership is aimed at innovation (Burns 1978: 434; Masciulli et al. 2009: 
3). This is the criterion which distinguishes leadership from management. Leaders have thus been 
described as those who change the equilibrium ways of doing things or as ‘architects of institutional 
change’ (Schofield 2002). 
Hence, I define political leadership as a process where an actor in a formal or informal position of 
authority uses her power resources in such a way as to guide the behaviour of others towards a 
common goal. In the case of success, this process results in innovation, namely policy or institutional 
change. 
The strategies a leader uses to achieve a common goal can be divided into two sets (Table 2 in online 
appendix): by providing common knowledge, a leader provides a group with new beliefs about which 
policy instrument works best in a given situation (Schofield 2002; Masciulli et al. 2009: 7); by enhancing 
collective action, a leader deploys negotiation strategies to help a group overcoming classical 
cooperation problems such as coordination or free-rider dilemmas (Tallberg 2006: 37-9; Young 1991: 
285).1 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
Leadership is conceptualised as a way of overcoming collective action problems in situations where 
there are no adequate institutions to regulate the collective action. The first possible outcome we can 
observe in such a situation is the non-appearance of leadership (or leadership vacuum). If a leader 
emerges, however, she might still not be able to realise the desired institutional or policy change. This 
leadership failure is the second possible outcome. Finally, a leader might emerge and successfully 
influence the outcomes, which is the third possible outcome. Hence, the theoretical framework of this 
                                                          
1 A detailed elaboration on the single strategies can be found in Schoeller 2014: 5-7. 
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work is divided into two analytical steps, which are the emergence of leadership and its impact on the 
outcomes. 
 
The emergence of leadership 
LEVEL  CAUSAL PATH 
  Independent Variable  Causal 
Mechanism 
 Dependent Variable 
(Emergence of L.) 
       
Micro-level 
(Actors) 
 Leader’s surplus  
 
Status quo costs 
 
 
Supply 
+ 
Demand 
 Presence of L. 
 
Absence of L. 
       
       
Macro-level 
(Environment) 
 Institutional 
completeness 
    
       
Figure 1: The emergence of political leadership 
Reference: own illustration 
Apart from formalised selection processes such as democratic elections, a leader emerges if there is a 
demand and a supply of it. The demand for leadership arises from status quo costs which are caused 
by suboptimal collective action outcomes (Tallberg 2010). These costs are either already present or 
imminent in the case of status quo. If the status quo costs are high, the actors involved perceive a high 
pressure for action. At this point powerful actors weigh the expected costs of leading against its 
benefits. If an actor comes to the conclusion that leading would make her better off, she offers 
leadership. This is done by an expression of her preferences with regard to a change of the status quo. 
The other actors, which thereby become potential followers, perceive this expression of preferences 
and at least some of them object. The powerful actor can now react by employing strategies to reach 
Selection mechanism: 
most powerful actor 
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an outcome as close as possible to her preferences. In this case, she emerges as a leader. If more than 
one actor offers leadership, the most powerful emerges as a leader because her absence in a final 
agreement would cause the highest costs for the others and, having most resources, she maximizes 
the group’s chances for the achievement of the common goal. 
This leads to two expectations. Regarding the supply-side, leadership is offered if at least one of the 
actors involved is willing to take the lead. Willingness depends on the payoffs to the potential leaders 
(Mattli 1999: 13), which means that there must be a ‘leader’s surplus’ (Frohlich et al. 1971: 7). Hence, 
on condition that there is a demand for leadership, the following applies: 
If the expected benefits of leading exceed the perceived costs of it, leadership is offered and emerges. 
Regarding the demand-side, a leader serves the followers to overcome collective action problems: a 
lack of common knowledge or cooperation problems cause status quo costs which can be removed by 
a leader (Beach and Mazzucelli 2007: 8f). Therefore, under the condition that there is an offer of 
leadership: 
If the aggregate status quo costs are high, there is a high demand for leadership, and leadership 
emerges. 
 
The impact of leadership 
Once a leader has emerged, she attempts to achieve the desired institutional or policy change through 
the use of her power resources. There are two ways the resources can take effect. First, the leader 
translates them into strategies, for instance by making side-payments to relative losers, setting the 
agenda or providing expertise (Schoeller 2014: 5-7; Table 2 in online appendix). Second, followers 
anticipate that the resources might be deployed to their disadvantage if they do not behave as the 
leader wants them to. This is what Carl Friedrich described as the ‘rule of anticipated reactions’ (1963: 
199-215). However, a leader’s success not only depends on her power resources. Also the support of 
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the followers and the requirements of the underlying decision-making rules play a role: the more 
followers agree with the leader on the proposed innovation and the less the leader is constrained by 
institutions, the easier it is to influence the outcomes in the desired way. 
LEVEL CAUSAL PATH 
 Independent Variable  Causal Mechanism  Dependent 
Variable 
(Impact of L.) 
 
 
Micro-level 
(Actors) 
 
 
Leader’s power resources 
 
Distribution of preferences 
 
 
 
 
Use of strategies / 
Anticipated reaction 
  
 
Policy or 
institutional change 
      
Macro-level 
(Environment) 
Institutional constraint    No policy or 
institutional change 
      
Figure 2: The impact of political leadership 
Reference: own illustration 
Hence, the first expectation accounting for a leader’s impact refers to her power resources: 
The more power resources are at a leader’s disposal (in relation to the power resources of the 
followers), the stronger is ceteris paribus her impact on the outcomes.  
The second expectation regards the distribution of preferences. Preferences can converge on the 
outcome preferred by the leader, they can be distributed throughout the preference space 
(heterogeneity of preferences), or they can converge on an outcome different from the one preferred 
by the leader (Figure 4 in online appendix). If preferences over outcomes diverge, at least some actors 
have to depart from their preferred outcomes to find an agreement. These actors have to bear the 
respective costs which can be described as the difference between the utility of their preferred 
outcome and the utility of the outcome they finally get. By using her power resources, a leader can 
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make the winners compensate for these costs (‘Kaldor-Hicks improvement’), find solutions that make 
everyone better off (‘Pareto improvement’), or simply make certain actors accept the costs. In any 
case, the more the preferences diverge from the outcome preferred by the leader, the more power 
resources are needed and the harder it is to affect the outcomes in the desired way. Hence: 
The stronger the convergence of preferences around the outcome preferred by the leader, the stronger 
is ceteris paribus her impact on the outcomes. 
The third expectation concerns the institutional constraint, which determines a leader’s latitude in 
decision-making (Tallberg 2010: 246). This ranges from complete discretion by the leader, via  decision-
making by consent or participation of the followers (under simple majority, qualified majority, or 
unanimity), through to the interdiction of making certain decisions (Table 3 in online appendix): 
The higher the degree of institutional constraint, the weaker is ceteris paribus the leader’s impact on 
the outcomes. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The following case studies serve to test the theoretical model. From among all the instances of crisis-
management since 2009, I selected one case for each of the three possible outcomes described above: 
the first bailout of Greece (non-appearance of leadership), the attempt to establish an EU ‘super-
commissioner’ (leadership failure), and the shaping of the Fiscal Compact (successful leadership). 
A precondition for the emergence of leadership is the incompleteness of institutions dealing with the 
underlying collective action problem. With regard to the Eurozone crisis, a twofold lack of institutions 
has been identified. First, there were no institutions regulating the mutualisation of risk (distributional 
problem). Second, the institutions built to prevent moral hazard, basically the Stability and Growth 
Pact and the ‘No-bailout clause’, turned out to be insufficient (free-rider problem) (Buti and Carnot 
2012: 901, 905f; De Grauwe 2013; Drudi et al. 2012: 894; Schelkle 2012). 
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The first financial assistance to Greece 
When in late 2009 it became clear that Greece was entering into a sovereign debt crisis, there was a 
consensus among the Eurozone member states (MS) that bankruptcy or even ‘Grexit’ was not a viable 
option because of the dire economic and political consequences this would have had for the entire 
Eurozone at the time (Interviews 5, 8, 11, 25, 26; Ardagna and Caselli 2014: 297; Schimmelfennig 2015: 
181f). The question of leadership, therefore, did not concern the bailout as such, but rather the shape 
this bailout would take. From a German perspective, there were two ideal-typical options: first, an 
early and unambiguous commitment to do whatever it took to keep Greece in the Eurozone; second, 
no commitment at all and delaying any decision as long as possible. 
As pointed out by Jones (2010), an early commitment would have calmed the financial markets, so 
that Greece would have had fewer problems in refinancing its debt. For Germany this would have 
meant a lower volume of loans if a bailout would take place, a lower risk of contagion within the 
Eurozone, and less depreciation of Greek and other government bonds in German banks’ balance 
sheets. By making such an early commitment, Germany would have used its power resources in such 
a way as to guide the other MS towards a common goal, namely a cheaper (or even no) bailout and 
more stability in the Eurozone. Germany would have assumed leadership. 
Yet, Germany did clearly not emerge as a leader, but opted for the second option described: ‘In early 
2010, Germany was the most reluctant EA country to commit itself to the Greek bailout’ 
(Schimmelfennig 2015: 182; also Interviews 1, 10, 12; Ludlow 2010: 12-7). Despite becoming 
increasingly isolated, the German chancellor denied any need for financial assistance to Greece until 
the very last moment. As one senior official of the German Treasury admitted: at the end Germany 
were the only ones still hesitating (Interview 25). When asked if and under which conditions Germany 
would be willing to grant financial assistance to Greece, Merkel simply replied that there was no need 
for help (Janssen 2012). 
9 
 
The first variable accounting for a leader’s emergence is her surplus. Table 4 (online appendix) provides 
an overview of Germany’s costs and benefits of leading according to the interviewees. The most 
frequently mentioned cost of leading is the causation of moral hazard. The German government feared 
that an early commitment to bail out Greece would be perceived as a signal that painful fiscal discipline 
is not rewarding because in the end there would always be a lender of last resort in the Eurozone. 
Thus, the ‘No-bailout clause’ (Article 125 TFEU) would be de facto neutralised and fiscal free-riding 
would become rewarding in the Eurozone. Especially for Germany this would become very costly. The 
only way to avoid such a result was to make sure that an eventual bailout would not be a ‘cheap 
solution’ for the respective debtor state. 
A second aspect concerned the expected electoral costs. Given that public opinion was perceived as 
sceptical with regard to financial assistance to Greece, the German government feared that a pro-
active role in a bailout would imply a significant loss of votes. Thirdly, taking the lead would have 
worsened Germany’s bargaining position with regard to a Greek consolidation programme: the earlier 
Germany committed itself to a bailout, the better the Greek negotiation position would be and the 
more lenient the resulting consolidation programme. Finally, given that there was a lot of uncertainty 
as regards the magnitude as well as the legal and technical features of the bailout, the consequences 
of an early commitment could hardly be estimated. Taking the lead would therefore have been a risky 
undertaking. 
In stark contrast to all the costs of leading, only one respondent mentioned a potential benefit, namely 
that German business would profit from economic prosperity in Greece. The underlying rationale is in 
line with the argumentation of Jones (2010) that an early commitment by Germany would have calmed 
the financial markets, resulting in more foreign investment, internal demand and growth, and less 
depreciation of German banks’ balance sheets. Thus, German leadership would have been in the 
interest of both German banks and the German export industry. 
One way of comparing costs against benefits is to use a ‘common currency’. In this case, this is given 
by the material savings of an early commitment (as opposed to the material costs it would bring about). 
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From a German perspective, an early commitment might have helped to avoid the short-term costs of 
a bailout, but it would not have resolved the persisting structural problems. Thus, there would have 
been only weak incentives for fiscal discipline in the Eurozone. The German government feared that 
this would have led to much bigger bailouts of Greece and other MS at a later point in time (Interviews 
10, 27). As long as Germany and other creditor states were willing and able to bear the costs of such 
bailouts, either bilaterally or in the context of a ‘Transfer Union’, the feared long-term costs would 
thus consist in Germany becoming the ‘paymaster’ of the Eurozone. In sum, the expected benefits of 
leading, namely a cheaper (or even no) bailout for the time being, are clearly outweighed by the costs 
of becoming the Eurozone’s ‘lender of last resort’. The electoral costs and the uncertainty only add to 
this calculation. Hence, given that there was no leadership surplus for Germany, we expect that 
Germany would not offer leadership and thus not emerge as a leader. 
The second independent variable accounting for a leader’s emergence are the status quo costs. Of the 
19 interviewees who comprehensively answered the question when the status quo costs 
(operationalized as ‘perceived pressure for action’) were highest during the crisis, 13 (68.4%) named 
the first Greek bailout. Most of the costs were expected in the event that the status quo led to a 
sovereign default of Greece. They consisted in a new banking and economic crisis, but ultimately also 
in the end of the common currency (Interviews 1, 5, 8, 11, 25, 26; Ardagna and Caselli 2014: 296f). 
Hence, the status quo costs were very high which led to a strong demand for leadership. 
In sum, the theoretical model appears plausible since it can deliver an explanation as to why Germany 
did not emerge as a leader. The high costs caused by the status quo created a high demand for 
leadership. By taking the lead, Germany could have produced a collectively better outcome and 
possibly avoided a short-term contagion of Portugal and Spain (Ardagna and Caselli 2014: 292; Ludlow 
2010: 28). This outcome, however, would have been further away from its individual preferences. 
Therefore, as expected by the rationalist model of this work, Germany did not take the lead and left 
the Eurozone worse off. 
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The Super-commissioner 
In autumn 2011, the Dutch government suggested considerably strengthening the competences of the 
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs (at the time Olli Rehn). The proposal was 
supported by the German government and most notably by its Finance Minister Schäuble (Interview 
11; Spiegel and Schäuble 2011). However, although Rehn’s position was slightly strengthened, the 
crucial features of the plan, namely full discretion in the College of Commissioners and a veto on 
national budgets, were not realised.  
In October 2012, Schäuble therefore started a new initiative with the same demands. In doing so, he 
represented the German government and was clearly backed by Chancellor Merkel (BBC News 2012; 
EurActiv 2012c). Schäuble mentioned the idea repeatedly in the Eurogroup and promoted it through 
public speeches and the media (Interviews 2, 7, 8, 13, 25; Lamers and Schäuble 2014; Schäuble 2014). 
Thus, Germany provided a ‘light’ version of leadership: it emerged as a leader, but restricted itself to 
the provision of common knowledge, thereby avoiding the more expensive employment of negotiation 
strategies. Still, the super-commissioner has not been realised and is thus ‘a case of attempted, but 
ultimately unsuccessful, institutional change’ (Karagiannis and Guidi 2014: 177). 
The first variable accounting for a leader’s emergence is her surplus. The most obvious benefit 
Germany would gain from a super-commissioner would be a further institutionalization of fiscal 
discipline in the Eurozone (Interviews 1, 25-27). As pointed out by Schimmelfennig (2015), the 
adjustment costs caused by the goal of preserving the monetary union can be allocated either 
nationally through fiscal restraint (austerity) or supranationally through the mutualisation of debt 
(solidarity). Thus, the more an outcome of crisis management shifts the adjustment costs towards the 
national level, as the super-commissioner would do, the more beneficial this is for creditor states like 
Germany. Apart from this, the alleged calming effect on the markets, the electoral approval, and the 
possibility to shift the blame for painful austerity measures to the Commission were mentioned as 
further benefits for Germany (Interviews 1, 8, 27). 
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As opposed to these benefits, there were no relevant costs of leading, especially because the German 
government had neither committed itself to any concessions in exchange for the super-commissioner 
nor had the idea provoked any significant disapproval from voters. Therefore, we expect Germany to 
offer leadership and, under the condition that there was also a demand, to emerge as a leader. 
The second variable accounting for a leader’s emergence refers to the status quo costs. When Schäuble 
aired his proposal in October 2012, the peak of the crisis had already been overcome due to the effect 
of the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). However, at the time the actors had little 
confidence in the lasting effect of these measures and considered themselves to be still in the middle 
of the crisis. Thus, a demand for leadership action that would go beyond the measures taken by the 
ECB was still present (Interview 6). In sum, given that the status quo costs at the time were still 
perceived as high and the benefits to Germany from leading clearly exceeded the costs of it, both 
expectations of the first analytical step are confirmed. 
Further evidence concerning the underlying causal mechanisms shows that the German government 
indeed presented the super-commissioner as a way of changing the status quo to the advantage of the 
entire group, thereby invoking the notion of a common goal, and, in accordance with the second 
expectation, that the other MS perceived this offer of leadership and at least some of them objected 
to it (BBC News 2012; EurActiv 2012a; 2012c; Interviews 10, 27). 
The first variable accounting for a leader’s impact are her power resources (Table 1 in online appendix). 
As regards Germany’s material resources, the most important indicator in the context of the crisis is 
the aggregate GDP because this determines the capacity to contribute to financial stability in the 
Eurozone. However, a MS’s refinancing options (government bond yields), its savings potential (current 
account balance) and its long-term solvency (gross public debt) are also relevant. Table 5 (online 
appendix) shows Germany’s superiority in terms of economic power resources at a glance. In 2011, it 
had the largest GDP in the Eurozone, the lowest interest rates for its debt, and the biggest current 
account surplus in absolute terms. 
13 
 
The second type of power resources are institutional. As regards crisis management, the central 
institutional arenas are the Eurogroup, the ECOFIN Council and the European Council. At the time of 
Germany’s super-commissioner initiative, Germany’s voting weight in the Council corresponded to 
8.4% of all votes and to 31.9% of the blocking minority (Krotz and Schild 2013: 26f). However, in the 
Eurogroup and ECOFIN Council ‘there is a strong sense to come to joint, common solutions’ (Interview 
15). Therefore, based on its superior economic resources, Germany enjoyed a de facto veto in these 
fora. As a high-level official in Brussels put it: ‘Germany practically has a veto on whatever is happening 
at present. And if they don’t like it, they don’t take it. So you need to rewrite and rewrite and rewrite, 
until the Germans are in agreement’ (Interview 13; also Interviews 10, 11). The same is true for the 
European Council where decisions are also formally taken by consensus. 
Ideational resources, finally, regard a leader’s information, credibility and legitimacy (Parker and 
Karlsson 2014: 586f; Tallberg 2006: 14f). The German government has roughly the same information 
and expertise as the other MS, but it relies to a considerable extent on the larger resources of the 
Commission and the ECB. Germany’s credibility, in contrast, is higher than that of the other MS because 
of two different sources. First, the high credibility Germany enjoys in the capital markets is essential 
to the stability of the common currency. Second, the strong roles of the German parliament 
(Bundestag) and the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) function as a credible 
commitment at the European level (Interviews 3, 15, 25).2 Also as regards legitimacy, Germany was 
perceived to have the biggest claim to a hearing among the MS because of its economic weight 
(Interview 2; Spiegel and Schäuble 2011). In sum, on all three types of resources, Germany scores the 
same or higher than the other MS. 
The second explanatory factor accounting for a leader’s impact is the group’s preference distribution. 
The main conflict of interests in the case of the super-commissioner reflected the North-South divide 
                                                          
2 The important role of these two actors can be considered that of collective domestic veto-players in the sense 
of Tsebelis (2002). 
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in the Eurozone: ‘solvent northern countries prefer national adjustment [while] heavily indebted 
southern countries prefer mutualized adjustment’ (Schimmelfennig 2015: 181). A secondary cleavage 
separated those states principally in favour of more integration from those unwilling to give up further 
sovereignty (Interviews 2, 25). As a result, only a few MS – namely Austria, Estonia and the Netherlands 
– shared the German preference for a super-commissioner, which implied both national adjustment 
costs for the highly indebted states and further integration through treaty change. Among the 
European institutions, the Commission was most firmly against the super-commissioner proposal. 
While the European Parliament’s (EP) approval seemed to depend on the question of whether the 
super-commissioner would provide it with any institutional advantages, the ECB was Germany’s only 
ally among the institutions (Interviews 2, 7, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 21-25, 27). As illustrated by Figure 3 
below, the resulting preference distribution can be described as a weak convergence on another 
outcome than the one preferred by Germany, namely no super-commissioner. 
With regard to the third explanatory factor, institutional constraint, the realisation of a super-
commissioner would require an amendment of the EC’s rules of procedure and a change of Article 250 
TFEU (Interviews 1, 2, 13, 15, 25, 27). Given that EU treaty changes require unanimity, this corresponds 
to the highest level of decision-making by participation (Table 3 in online appendix). 
In sum, also the second analytical step accounting for a leader’s impact appears to be plausible. Two 
expectations are directly confirmed. The fact that Germany has not succeeded in establishing a super-
commissioner despite its superior power resources can be explained by the unfavourable preference 
constellation and the high institutional constraint. In order to increase confidence in this explanation, 
I further traced the presumed causal mechanism: if the unfavourable preference distribution and the 
high institutional requirements really prevented Germany from reaching its goal, there must be 
evidence that the German government was either not willing or not able to compensate all of the 
reluctant followers. The evidence indeed confirms that Germany was not willing to pay the high 
counter-price for a super-commissioner, which, according to the most concrete proposal, could have 
consisted in the introduction of Eurobonds (Interviews 10, 25, 27; EurActiv 2012b; 2012c). 
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The Fiscal Compact 
In the shaping of the Fiscal Compact, Germany clearly assumed a leading role (Beach 2013; Ludlow 
2012; Schoeller 2014). Among other purposes, the Fiscal Compact served to ‘anchor market 
expectations regarding the sustainability of public finances in Europe (and narrow the […] abnormally 
high government bond spreads)’ (Drudi et al. 2012: 894). It thereby contributed to the common goal 
of preserving the common currency. This does not mean that the final treaty was the outcome 
preferred by all the actors involved, but that ‘the common interest of preserving the Euro and the 
Eurozone was paramount to the different preferences of highly solvent and highly indebted member 
states’ (Schimmelfennig 2014: 329). Thus, Germany emerged and succeeded as a leader in shaping the 
Fiscal Compact. 
According to the first expectation regarding a leader’s emergence, leadership is supplied if the benefits 
exceed the costs of it. As regards benefits to Germany, all but one of the interviewees agreed that the 
Fiscal Compact was primarily a signal to the financial markets and to the German voters. The markets 
should be reassured that fiscal discipline would actually be implemented in the highly indebted states 
and that thus there would not be a sovereign default. Furthermore, the treaty should signal to German 
voters that their taxpayer money would not be exposed to moral hazard in the Eurozone (Interviews 
1, 4, 6, 8, 13, 15, 25, 27). As regard Germany’s costs, there was a consensus among the interviewees 
that there were no relevant costs of leading involved: the debt brake provided for by the treaty had 
already been implemented in Germany and the ESM had also already been decided upon. Therefore, 
no significant concessions were needed to realise the Fiscal Compact, which was largely perceived as 
the legitimate counter price for Germany joining the ESM (Interview 8, 25). Hence, the benefits of 
leading clearly prevailed. Thus, we expect that Germany would offer leadership and, under the 
condition that there was also a demand, that it would emerge as a leader. 
The second explanatory factor accounting for a leader’s emergence are the status quo costs. Of 19 
interviewees who answered the question of when the perceived pressure for action was highest during 
the crisis, 7 (36.8%) referred to autumn and winter 2011, which is the time when Germany put the 
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ECB 
EC 
EP 
No Super-commissioner 
ECB 
EC 
EP 
Fiscal Compact as Community law 
No Fiscal Compact 
Fiscal Compact on the agenda. Another 3 interviewees assessed the pressure for action as very high, 
although they did not perceive it as the most critical moment in the crisis. Hence, given that the status 
quo costs were high and Germany’s benefits of leading exceeded the costs of it, both expectations 
regarding Germany’s emergence as a leader are confirmed. 
With regard to Germany’s impact on the outcomes, Germany’s power resources are naturally the same 
in the case of the super-commissioner and the Fiscal Compact. The distribution of preferences changes 
considerably, however, since apart from the UK, none of the actors was really against the Fiscal 
Compact. To be sure, especially France and Italy were sceptical at the beginning. However, against the 
background of strong market pressures, ‘there was a collective recognition’ that such a signal was 
needed to calm the markets and stabilize the Eurozone (Interview 15; also 1, 5, 7, 8, 25, 27). Although 
the Commission and the EP would have preferred a solution within EU law, they had no major 
objections against the contents of the Fiscal Compact as such. The ECB was once again Germany’s 
strongest supporter (Interviews 6-8, 12, 15, 18-21, 23-27). In sum, as opposed to the case of the super-
commissioner, the preferences converged on the outcome preferred by Germany (Figure 3). 
Mutualized adjustment  
(‘Solidarity’) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 National 
                                                                  adjustment 
 (‘Austerity’) 
 
           = Germany’s preferred outcome 
           = Super-commissioner 
Mutualized adjustment  
(‘Solidarity’) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 National 
                                                                  adjustment 
 (‘Austerity’) 
 
           = Germany’s preferred outcome 
           ≈ Fiscal Compact as treaty 
Figure 3: Preference distribution Super-commissioner vs. Fiscal Compact 
Reference: own illustration; non-labelled dots represent the preferences of those MS on which 
information could be gathered 
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The institutional constraint on Germany was slightly lower than in the case of the super-commissioner, 
because the actors willing to sign the agreement could do this also outside EU law. Nevertheless, 
support from almost all of the 17 Eurozone countries was necessary to achieve the desired outcome 
of sending an effective signal to the markets. Hence, the institutional constraint was still very high 
(Table 3 in online appendix). 
The model provides a plausible explanation for Germany’s success in shaping the Fiscal Compact. Two 
expectations (power resources and preference distribution) are directly confirmed and help to explain 
why Germany achieved the desired outcome despite the high institutional constraint. Furthermore, by 
tracing the underlying causal mechanisms, I found ample evidence that Germany indeed managed to 
overcome the high institutional constraint by means of its economic power resources: 
First, Germany translated its resources into strategies. Most notably, this regards arena-shifting. By 
bringing the issue directly to the level of the heads of state and government, the Commission and the 
EP were circumvented and the signal effect of the legal provisions was strengthened (Ludlow 2012: 3). 
Moreover, when it turned out that the UK would veto a Treaty change, Merkel shifted the arena again 
by pushing for an international treaty outside EU law. Another example concerns the use of agenda-
setting and issue-linking: by making assistance from the ESM conditional on the ratification of the Fiscal 
Compact and including the French demand for formal ‘Euro summits’, Germany managed to win over 
more sceptical actors (Interviews 10, 11; Beach 2013: 117-9, 126). Furthermore, the German 
government acted as a ‘provider of common knowledge’: in August 2011, Germany and France 
proposed the incorporation of a ‘debt brake’ into national constitutions (Bundesregierung 2011).3 In 
the following months, Germany used all its diplomatic weight to promote the idea: German 
                                                          
3 Although the Franco-German cooperation in the crisis management would deserve more attention, I must limit 
myself to state that throughout the crisis there has been a strong asymmetry between France and Germany in 
terms of power, activity and preference attainment, so that in the cases in which Germany assumed leadership, 
France seemed to be rather co-opted than an actual leadership partner (e.g. Bulmer/Paterson 2013: 1394f). 
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ambassadors approached the respective governments in the MS, bilateral meetings took place at the 
level of heads of unit and between state secretaries, all possible fora were used to promote the idea 
of a debt brake, including even the IMF and the G7, and the chancellor herself met her colleagues to 
promote the Fiscal Compact (Interviews 15, 26; Rinke 2011). 
The second way in which Germany’s economic power resource took effect is more subtle. The other 
actors simply anticipated that if they did not have special regard to this German preference, the 
reaction of Germany could be harmful to them: ‘if Germany is not on board, the whole thing collapses’ 
(Interview 15). This mechanism played an important role in the shaping of the Fiscal Compact which 
was perceived as a ‘concession to Germany’ in exchange for its contribution to the ESM (Interviews 5; 
also 10, 25). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The theoretical model proposed in this article has been corroborated by the case studies. Although 
there has been a high demand for leadership throughout the crisis, Germany emerged as a leader only 
when the benefits of leading exceeded its costs (Table 6 in online appendix). Once emerged, Germany 
influenced the outcomes by means of its superior economic power resources. However, power alone 
does not suffice to exercise successful leadership. The preferences of the ‘followers’ and the 
institutional environment also play a crucial role. If we compare the super-commissioner proposal with 
the shaping of the Fiscal Compact, we see that in both cases the power resources and the institutional 
constraint were the same. Thus, we can affirm that it is indeed the distribution of preferences which 
accounts for Germany’s different impact on the outcomes in the two cases (Table 7 in online appendix). 
In cases in which Germany did not emerge as a leader, other actors had the chance or were even forced 
to take the lead. The ECB’s launch of the OMT, the Commission’s proactive role in shaping the so-called 
six-pack regulations, but also its unwillingness to take the lead in the issue of Eurobonds, could 
therefore be further cases to test the theoretical model proposed by this article. Indeed, the article 
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not only aims to explain Germany’s unsteady role as regards leadership in the crisis, but also to provide 
a model to explain other situations in which collective actors refrain from offering, fail in delivering, or 
succeed in exercising political leadership. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Power resources 
Material Institutional Ideational 
Economic capabilities 
Military capabilities 
Procedural rights, e.g. 
 
Agenda management 
Veto rights 
Executive competences 
etc. 
Information (incl. expertise) 
Credibility 
Legitimacy 
Reference: own illustration, based on Krotz and Schild 2013: 22-4. 
 
 
Table 2: Leadership strategies 
Providing Common Knowledge Enhancing Collective Action 
Problem definition 
Presentation of new ideas 
Promotion of new ideas 
Agenda-management 
Arena-shifting 
Coalition-building 
Unilateral action 
Leading by example 
Reference: own illustration 
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Table 3: Degrees of institutional constraint 
DEGREE OF 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINT 
THEORY EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES (EU) 
   
1. DISCRETION  
Complete Special legislative procedure based on 
Articles 45(3)(d) and 106(3) TFEU 
(= Commission acting alone) 
Consultation  
  
2. CONSENT  
Simple  
Qualified majority Consent procedure 
(e.g. international agreements) Unanimity 
  
3. PARTICIPATION  
Simple  
Qualified majority  
 Ordinary legislative procedure 
 Intergovernmental treaty 
Unanimity Treaty amendment 
  
4. INTERDICTION - Ex post facto law 
- Legislation in CFSP 
- Legislation violating the principles of 
conferral, proportionality, or 
subsidiarity 
etc. 
  
Reference: own illustration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
Table 4: Germany’s costs and benefits of leading according to interviewees (in bold: strongly involved 
respondents; in italics: German government officials) 
INTERVIEW BENEFITS COSTS 
  MORAL HAZARD 
5  Taking the lead by making an early commitment creates 
moral hazard in Greece and other MS 
7  Moral hazard, see above 
10  Risk setting a precedent with regard to other MS (= wrong 
signal) 
12  Moral hazard, see above 
15  Wrong signal (German reluctance was functional in order 
to give the right signal to other MS, i.e. ‘bailout is not a 
cheap solution’) 
26  Wrong signal to other MS (bailout must be costly) 
27  Achieving no (or only weak) consolidation programme in 
Greece (Greece only reluctantly adopted adjustment 
measures; they needed to be forced; thus, early 
commitment would not have been a sustainable solution) 
  ELECTORAL COSTS 
1 German business 
profits from 
economic prosperity 
in Greece 
Acting against public opinion 
8  Acting against public opinion (incl. experts, media, academia) 
15  Lack of legitimacy: German government was afraid that an 
early or stronger commitment would run counter to the 
expectations of German voters 
25  Taking the lead would have implied electoral costs 
26  Electoral costs, see above 
  BARGAINING POSITION 
13  Low pressure on Greece, leading to a worse bargaining 
position of Germany 
15  Wrong signal (German reluctance was functional in order 
to give the right signal to Greece, i.e. ‘structural reform is 
indispensable) 
26  An early commitment would have resulted in a ‘bad’ 
consolidation programme (‘bargaining position needs to be 
built up along the extremes’) 
27  An early commitment would not have allowed for effective 
conditionality (financial assistance must always imply 
incentives for reform) 
  UNCERTAINTY 
10  Uncertainty as regards the outcomes of leading; 
Uncertainty as regards tools and design of bailout (esp. the 
role of IMF) 
15  Uncertainty as regards the outcomes of leading 
Reference: own illustration 
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Table 5: Germany’s Economic Power Resources (2011) 
 GDP GOVERNMENT 
BOND YIELDS 
(10 YEARS) 
CURRENT ACCOUNT 
BALANCE 
GROSS 
PUBLIC 
DEBT 
 Million EUR % of EU-17 % Million 
EUR 
% of GDP % of GDP 
Germany 2.699.100 27,7 2,61 164.550 6,1 77,9 
France 2.059.284 21,1 3,32 -21.245 -1,0 85,2 
Italy 1.638.857 16,8 5,42 -50.387 -3,1 116,4 
Spain 1.075.147 11,0 5,44 -34.040 -3,2 69,2 
Netherlands 642.929 6,6 2,99 58.579 9,1 61,3 
Belgium 379.915 3,9 4,23 -4.067 -1,1 102,0 
Austria 308.675 3,2 3,32 5.058 1,6 82,1 
Greece 207.752 2,1 15,75 -20.634 -9,9 171,3 
Finland 196.869 2,0 3,01 n/a n/a 48,5 
Portugal 176.167 1,8 10,24 -10.616 -6,0 111,1 
Ireland 171.042 1,8 9,60 n/a n/a 111,2 
Slovakia 70.160 0,7 4,45 -3.497 -5,0 43,4 
Luxembourg 42.410 0,4 2,92 2.461 5,8 19,1 
Slovenia 36.868 0,4 4,97 84 0,2 46,5 
Cyprus 19.487 0,2 5,79 n/a n/a 66,0 
Estonia 16.404 0,2 n/a 222 1,4 6,0 
Malta 6.903 0,1 4,49 n/a n/a 69,7 
Euro Area 
(EU-17) 
9.748.036 100,0 4,34 n/a n/a 86,0 
Reference: Eurostat (own illustration) 
 
 
Table 6: Cross-case comparison – Emergence of leadership 
 Emergence (dv) Leader’s Surplus (iv1) Status Quo Costs (iv2) 
First Greek bailout 0 0 1 
Super-commissioner 1 1 1 
Fiscal Compact 1 1 1 
Reference: own illustration 
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Table 7: Cross-case comparison – Impact of leadership 
 Impact (dv) Power 
Resources (iv1) 
Preference 
Distribution (iv2) 
Institutional 
Constraint (iv3) 
Super-commissioner No High Unfavourable High 
Fiscal Compact Yes High Favourable High 
Reference: own illustration 
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Figure 4: Distribution of preferences – ideal-typical values of variable 
Reference: own illustration 
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